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This extension of the railway system by means of feeder lines means that 
in many ways the early development of the system can be viewed, not in 
terms of booms and slumps, but in rational steps. By the end of 1833, three 
of the ﬁ  ve English provincial towns with a population of more than 100,000 
had railway links with London under construction; by the end of 1836 
only Portsmouth remained among English towns of over 50,000 popula-
tion without a line authorized; and by the end of 1837 most towns of more 
than 20,000 inhabitants were on or close to the route of an authorized 
railway.
1
The question of whether privately owned networks grow orderly or chaotic 
is of critical importance for transport planners and others who engage the 
issue of private ownership or privatisation of infrastructure. Few studies 
empirically investigate the sequence of network growth in a rigorous way. 
On the one hand are many largely qualitative studies of particular networks, 
especially prevalent in the history of railways.
2 On the other are a number 
of theoretical studies that posit a model of network growth, many of which 
compare the resulting patterns at equilibrium or some ﬁ  nite point to real or 
stylised networks but do not compare the sequence of their evolution to 
actual observation.
3
In the opening quote Reed suggests what we might dub an ‘orderliness 
hypothesis’ to explain the sequence of network growth, positing that places 
will be connected to the network roughly in order of their population 
density. (Density is used to control for area.)
4 Garrison and Marble make a 
similar observation when modelling the deployment of the Irish railway 
network, observing that nodes connect to the nearest large neighbour.
5 In 
contrast, Casson argues that the railway network was quite inefﬁ  cient in 
Britain, and reliance on state planning could have done much better in terms 
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The orderliness hypothesis implies the network follows the population, 
but the population may also follow the network, so there may be a reinforc-
ing effect, which is difﬁ  cult to disentangle. This research identiﬁ  es areas 
within a metropolitan system, to identify how quickly they connect to the 
network. While this process may differ from the inter-metropolitan system 
(or system of cities), there is a great deal of research to suggest the processes 
that explain the evolution of these two systems may be similar.
7
This article tests whether stations in London were built in the areas of 
highest density, measuring the correlation between the density of service 
(measured as stations per square kilometre) and population density (persons 
per square kilometre) of the administrative districts (boroughs) in London. 
There are two major networks to consider, the original surface rail system 
and the subsequent Underground systems. First, background on the network 
and land development of London is provided. Deﬁ  nitions for these systems 
and the source of data are described in the next section. This is followed 
by measurements of correlation for the two systems, and then discussion of 
ﬁ  ndings. The article concludes with some thoughts about new layers of the 
transport hierarchy.
Background
Prior to the advent of the steam railway London was a city of just over 1 
million people.
8 It was well served by both canals and turnpikes connecting 
to other parts of Britain.
9 The London & Greenwich Railway was the ﬁ  rst 
of many railways to reach London, the ﬁ  rst section opening in 1836 and 
being completed in 1838, making it possible to reach Greenwich in twelve 
minutes instead of the hour required by horse-drawn omnibus or steamboat. 
Famously built on a viaduct, the route was initially paralleled by a tree-lined 
boulevard that operated as a toll road, serving those unwilling to pay rail 
fares. However, the toll road was disbanded when the viaduct was widened 
to enable more frequent services to the densely populated urban core, ulti-
mately growing from two tracks to eleven.
10
Soon many other railways sought to connect to London. To avoid disrup-
tion in the core, a Royal Commission on Railway Termini, appointed in 
1846, drew a box around central London and decreed no line should enter 
the cordon, leading to railway termini being placed on the edges of the 
central region, and explaining in part why London has no uniﬁ  ed railway 
station.
11 Later (between 1858 and 1860) some penetrations of the box
12 
were permitted by Parliament, but most of the City of London remained 
untouched.
13 While preventing railways from severing the most densely 
populated part of the city, which would have been expensive for both the 
railways and the city, it created the need for a connection between the 
termini to allow transfers. The Metropolitan Railway, a private concern, 
like all railways of the era, but with some support from the Corporation of 
the City of London, was approved by Parliament in 1854. It aimed to 
connect the northern termini (Paddington, Euston, St Pancras, King’s Cross,  M






































and Farringdon, which was later added to the plan) to ease movement for 
through travellers.
The trends in the City of London were quite different from the rest of 
London. (Figure 1 displays a map of the boroughs of London.) As shown 
in Figure 2, the City of London has seen a long trend of depopulation from 
1851 (prior to the ﬁ  rst Underground line) and for many years saw increas-
ing employment, lending support to the notion that the railways, especially 
the Underground, enabled decentralisation of residences and concentration 
of employment.
The Metropolitan Railway opened in January 1863, and was extremely 
successful. Clearly the market was much larger than inter-line transfers. The 
company paid dividends throughout its life, though how it could afford to 
is suspect.
14 The better evidence for its success is in emulation. Many new 
railway lines were proposed: the 219 London-area railway Bills brought 
before Parliament during the period 1860–69 totalled 1,420  km (882 
miles).
15
Some of those lines were proposed prior to the opening of the Metropolitan, 
indicating the smell of success was in the air, though the peak years were 
between 1863 and 1866, following closely on the heels of the Metropolitan’s 
opening. The most important of these was the Metropolitan District Railway 
(later called the District Line), which ran just north of the river Thames but 
south of the Metropolitan, connecting a number of the southern railway 
Figure 1  London boroughs by name and location. M



























termini. Proposals for what became the Circle Line service linking the 
Metropolitan and District (roughly inscribing the box described above) were 
quickly proposed, but the two lines were not connected on both ends until 
1884. Both the Metropolitan and District lines were constructed using the 
cut-and-cover technique. Later lines, from the City & South London Railway 
(ﬁ  rst section opened in 1890) onwards, generally used deep-level tunnelling 
techniques to avoid disruption of city streets, existing railway lines, and 
public utilities when they needed to be below grade. Outside the Circle Line, 
however, the railways could emerge above ground and competed ﬁ  ercely in 
some markets, while operating unfettered in others, to provide suburban 
services. In some cases this involved building new lines, in others it involved 
acquiring running rights on (or ownership of) existing lines. The develop-
ment of suburbs was a way to develop trafﬁ  c for lines that in the city, though 
proﬁ  table, were operating below maximum capacity, and thus maximum 
proﬁ  tability.
The suburban extensions of what came to be known as the Underground 
were much more speculative than those built in the city. Though at-grade 
suburban lines were less expensive to construct, they also had a lower 
expectation of revenue. While in the city the demand was present through 
the high density of existing development, the suburban lines in many cases 
went through green ﬁ  elds. In contrast with the main-line railways, which 
had a long-distance market and could add a station on an existing line to 
test a new short-distance market at minimal cost, an Underground extension 
required both the line and the station in order to provide a new service to 
(rather than through) an initially sparsely developed area, what one might 
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Figure 2  Trends in the City of London.
Source Department of Planning and Transportation, City of London Workforce Info Census 
2001 (London, 2006)
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The suburban development along the surface railway lines began early. 
In 1853 the London & North Western Railway (LNWR) advertised in the 
Illustrated London News:
To persons intending to build houses of a suitable character and of a value 
of not less than $50 annual rent within two miles of the following stations 
viz. Harrow, Pinner, Bushey, Watford, Kings Langley, Boxmoor [now 
Hemel Hemstead] and Tring. A free annual ﬁ  rst class pass to one resident 
of each such house for the following periods—Harrow 11 years, Pinner 13 
years, Bushey 16 years, Watford 17 years and the other stations mentioned 
21 years.
16
The LNWR provided an enormous subsidy to the wealthy to build on land 
the railway did not own. The reasons for this can only be speculated. Was 
it to prime the pump, since the amount of revenue coming from these houses 
with an eleven to twenty-one-year free pass, discounted back to the present, 
would be quite small? Was it to encourage non-work travel, especially by 
other household members? Or did the railway, or its executives, have a 
hidden interest in development somehow?
Two decades later the suburbs had begun to take shape. ‘About the Barnet 
station has sprung up within the last few years one of those new half-ﬁ  nished 
railway villages which we have come to look on as almost a necessary 
adjunct to every station within a moderate distance of London.’
17 The 
network in the north-west quadrant of London was the least dense with 
surface railway lines. Not surprisingly, those were the unharvested suburban 
pastures that attracted the most attention from the Underground railways.
The powers to develop land varied. Section 127–8 of the Land Clauses 
Consolidation Act of 1845 required that, within ten years, railways must 
dispose of land not required for the projects identiﬁ  ed in the parliamentary 
Act describing and authorising the railway. The Metropolitan Railway Acts 
of 1868 and 1873, however, allowed the Metropolitan to hold on to such 
land for a longer period of time, putting the Metropolitan into the develop-
ment business in a way that other railways were not permitted.
18 The lack 
of effort to get similar provisions inserted into the Act of other railways 
suggests those railways did not wish to enter the development business.
The Metropolitan Railway acquired surplus land as it acquired right-of-
way. In large part, this was the acquisition of whole parcels when sellers did 
not want their property bisected by the railway. Unlike other railways in 
the United Kingdom, however, the Metropolitan had parliamentary author-
ity to develop that land, and did not sell surplus land as quickly as possible. 
The consequence of this was the development of Metro-land, and the ability 
to pay higher dividends due to its real estate division than other Underground 
railways were able to. That said, other railways, along with the Metropolitan, 
did work with developers to obtain subsidies for building stations near their 
new developments and promising to run services.
When Charles Tyson Yerkes—an American-born railway magnate who 
acquired a number of the deep-level Tube lines and the Metropolitan  M



























District Railway, as well as other transport properties—was investigating 
whether he should invest in the proposed Hampstead (now Northern) line 
in 1900, the following came to pass.
When they came to Golders Green, Lauderbeck [agent for Charles Yerkes] 
stopped and told Dalrymple-Hay [British civil engineer] that here was the 
proper site for the terminus, meeting protests about the absence of houses 
by pointing out that in the USA, railways were built and the people fol-
lowed. After visiting the site himself Yerkes asked, ‘Where’s London?’ and 




The [Hampstead, later Northern] line emerged into daylight to terminate 
in the ﬁ  elds bordering the Finchley Road. Most people were unimpressed 
by the wisdom of this move, but it is said a syndicate had already been 
formed to buy up the turnip ﬁ  elds before the announcement of the new 
line had affected land values. Thus at Golders Green ﬁ  rst began the typical 
pattern of twentieth-century suburban development, the arrival of an 
electric railway in some untouched rural area, soaring land values, 
semi-detached villas and chain stores.
20
Despite this activity, the sum of Metro-land developments created directly 
by the Metropolitan Railway and its subsidiaries amounts to only about 
15,000 houses on about 2,200 acres.
21 But when considering the accompa-
nying private developments that took advantage of the accessibility created 
by the railways, and thus gave trafﬁ  c to the railways, the change was enor-
mous.
22 The change is illustrated in Figures 3–6, which show the develop-
ment of both the railway networks and the population density of London 
from 1850 to 2000 at ﬁ  fty-year intervals.
Ultimately the co-development of suburbs and Underground lines came 
to a halt with the 1948 designation of a Green Belt around London.
23 This 
resulted in the cancellation of proposed line extensions, and hemmed in the 
Underground-served suburbs. Later suburban developments jumped the 
Green Belt, but these were to be served by automobile, bus, or surface rail. 
The next section quantitatively examines the extent to which rail and resi-
dential suburbs co-developed in an orderly fashion, from the advent of rail 
through the imposition of the Green Belt and the rise of the automobile, 
and whether that order was maintained.
Data, deﬁ  nitions and analysis
Deﬁ   nitions in this area are not straightforward. At present there is an 
Underground system operated by Transport for London (with infrastructure 
provided by private ﬁ  rms under long-term concessions) and a surface rail 
system whose tracks are managed by Network Rail, with trains operated by  M






































Figure 3  London railways and population density, 1850.
Figure 4  London railways and population density, 1900.
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Figure 5  London railways and population density, 1950.
Figure 6  London railways and population density, 2000.
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private companies under franchise agreements. Some stations (especially 
transfer stations) are managed by parties in one system but have services 
from the other. Much of the ‘Underground’ system operates above ground, 
and some is elevated, while some of the ‘surface’ system operates beneath 
or above the surface. This article deﬁ  nes the surface rail system as all cur-
rently existing London-area heavy-rail stations and lines that are not part 
of the 2006 Underground system, excluding Croydon Tramlink and 
Docklands Light Railway. Some services have historically been transferred 
from one system to another; it is their current ownership that is used to 
deﬁ  ne which system they are in.
Data for the Underground dates of station openings and closings were 
obtained from Rose.
24 Data for surface rail dates were from Borley.
25 A 
variety of sources were used to place stations in current administrative 
districts (boroughs).
Population data were obtained for the thirty-three current administrative 
districts (thirty-two boroughs and the City of London, collectively called 
boroughs throughout the article) of London going back to the 1801 census.
26 
Censuses that had been conducted before the current boundaries were 
established in 1965 had been recoded to give totals for the current areas. 
Thus we have twenty-one points in time for thirty-three areas, giving 693 
population data points. Ideally a similar procedure would be undertaken for 
employment. However, the employment data that are available in the nine-
teenth century are only by place of residence, which make them largely 
unusable to analyse transport systems, where we are interested in both sta-
tions that serve as commuting origins and those that serve as destinations. 
It was not until 1921 that the UK census asked questions about place of 
work, and these data are not yet digitised. Estimates for the City of London 
are discussed below.
27
To test the proposed hypothesis, the Pearson product–moment correla-
tion (r) is used. An r = 1 (or r = −1) indicates a perfect positive (negative) 
correlation; an r = 0 indicates no correlation.
28
Looking ﬁ  rst at surface rail service in London, it took several decades 
for the rail system to correlate well with population density, as the 
rail system was largely built from the outside in, while the Underground 
system was built from the inside out. As shown in Figure 7, from a correla-
tion between population density and surface rail station density of 0.56 in 
1841 (only a few years after rail ﬁ   rst entered what is now London in 
1836 in Greenwich, Lewisham, and Southwark), it already served twenty-
three boroughs (missing the present day boroughs of Islington, Lambeth, 
Richmond, Waltham Forest, Hounslow, Brent, Sutton, Barnet, Bexley, 
and Barking and Dagenham). By the census year of 1851 thirty-one 
boroughs were served, and by 1871 all thirty-three boroughs had at 
least one station.
At its peak in 1871 the correlation was 0.89. This soon began to drop as 
the population moved but the train stations and lines largely stayed put. The 
greatest mismatch occurred in 1951 when the correlation was down to 0.34  M



























(including the City of London) or 0.44 (excluding the City). The City of 
London is a major confounding factor, depopulating over time as it gained 
employment.
In 1863 the ﬁ  rst Underground railway, the Metropolitan Railway, was 
opened. Initially the Metropolitan served the boroughs of Westminster, 
Islington, and Camden (the third, fourth, sixth densest boroughs in 1871). 
In 1864 Hammersmith and Fulham (rank 10) and Kensington and Chelsea 
(rank 5) were added. In 1865 the City of London, then the densest borough, 
joined what came to be known as the London Underground system. In 1867 
Barnet (rank 27) and Haringey (rank 15) added stations on the Great 
Northern Railway that were ultimately incorporated into the London 
Underground system in 1939. For consistency they are included here but 
illustrate the complexity of making a clean distinction between the 
systems.
Figure 3 indicates there is a fairly strong correlation between rank of 
population density and rank of Underground station density. Including the 
City of London, the correlation starts at 0.77 for the ﬁ  rst eight boroughs 
(current administrative districts, including the City of London and City of 
Westminster) in 1871, the ﬁ  rst census year after the Underground was ﬁ  rst 
deployed, to 0.48 in 2001. However, the City of London itself greatly skews 
the results, as the Underground enabled it to depopulate and become an 
enormous centre of employment. As shown in its rank in Figure 1, from 
having the highest population density of all the thirty-three boroughs in 
1871 (at over 32,000 persons per square kilometre), it drops remarkably to 
the lowest population density of all boroughs a century later (a density of 
Correlation between Population Density Rank and Train Station Density Rank 












1841 1861 1881 1901 1921 1941 1961 1981 2001
Correlation
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(including City of London)
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(excluding City of London)
Figure 7  Correlation between population density rank and train station density rank 
of local administrative districts, 1841.
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only 1,663 persons per square kilometre). While there are no accurate data 
on employment dating back to the nineteenth century, as the census did not 
ask questions about place of work until 1921, estimates for the City of 
London are reproduced in Figure 1.
Though employment growth and depopulation may have been factors in 
some other central boroughs, none was so precipitous as the City of London. 
So running the same test but excluding the City gives us a stronger statisti-
cal correlation between population and Underground stations, changing 
from 0.77 in 1871 to 0.64 in 2001. This drop still indicates an increasing 
misﬁ  t between the location of stations and the distribution of population, 
which may tell the story of under-investment in the later part of the twen-
tieth century and the concomitant rise of alternative modes (trams and later 
motor buses and the automobile) serving the farther reaches of Greater 
London.
Still, there are some surprising mismatches between population and 
Underground stations. As Table 1 shows, Tower Hamlets, just to the 
east of the City of London, did not get Underground service until 
1882, almost twenty years after the introduction of the technology, 
despite having the second highest population density and being very 
close to the centre. Hackney did not get a station (Manor House) until 
1932 (and that is near the edge of the borough) despite having the 
fourth highest population density at the time. Manor House remains 
the only station in Hackney (although the proposed extensions to the 
East London Line may rectify that). The reasons for these mismatches 
can only be speculated, but factors may include the relatively lower 
incomes associated with the East End of London than the west, and 
thus the relatively higher use of less pricey surface transport modes 
(buses and trams).
Even today, several of the thirty-three boroughs remain without any 
Underground service; their population density ranks are given in parenthe-
ses (1871 rank, 2001 rank): Bexley (28, 27), Bromley (29, 33), Croydon 
(20, 24), Kingston upon Thames (19, 23), and Sutton (26, 22). It should be 
noted that all are on the edge of Greater London, all have commuter rail 
service, and since 2000 Croydon has Tramlink, a partially grade separated 
light rail service connecting to the Underground and surface rail systems at 
Wimbledon.
This uneven distribution of service does create some political problems 
for the agencies administering the London Underground. Attempts to change 
the basis of revenue away from fares and towards other sources (e.g. the 
Fares Fair campaign of the Greater London Council in the early 1980s, 
which tried to lower fares and increase the ‘rates’ (tax) paid by households) 
faced political opposition on the issue that some boroughs remain without, 
or with only poor, service and do not wish to cross-subsidise other boroughs 
with better service.
29 Many jurisdictions, especially in the United States, 
which rely on public ﬁ  nance, do end up with a large amount of public transit 
service in lower-density suburban areas to satisfy the political logic that  M



























requires spatially extensive service to achieve the political coalition required 
for the subsidies to provide service where it is most needed.
30
Discussion and conclusion
This article examined the correlations between the extent of the rail network 
in London with population density. The rail network initially went where 
the people were, and then developed new lines (and opened new stations 
on existing lines) in green ﬁ   elds that were subsequently developed 
and populated. With the advent of competing modes (tram, motor bus, 
car) and reduced investment in rail in lower-density areas the strong 
correlation between rail network location and population diminished 
over time.
While there is clearly some order to the deployment, and by and large 
the densest areas got service before the less dense areas, there was still a 
great deal of inequity and unevenness in the process. Ideally, service and 
demand would track very closely. Use of station density and population 
density as surrogates for service and demand is an approximation, but 
informs us of the degree to which there was a mismatch.
What might cause the correlation to be imperfect? A number of possi-
bilities emerge. First, entrepreneurs built infrastructure based on anticipated 
proﬁ  ts. Proﬁ  t is deﬁ  ned in economic terms as revenue minus cost. While 
revenue may be roughly proportional to population density (for commuting 
origins) or employment density (for commuting destinations), costs rise with 
density. Building underground is much more expensive than building on 
the surface, and generally is undertaken only if the lowered cost of land 
Correlation between Population Density Rank and Tube Station Density Rank 
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Figure  8  Correlations between population density rank and Underground station 
density rank of London administrative districts, 1950.
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acquisition outweighs the higher cost of construction. The ﬁ  rst Underground 
lines were built using the ‘cut and cover’ technique. Later Underground lines 
had to avoid conﬂ  ict with the ﬁ  rst, and were built deeper, using other tun-
nelling methods that were more expensive from a tunnelling perspective but 
less expensive after considering the costs of utility relocation and street 
disruption. After noting those differences, costs are not uniform across the 
region.
Several factors may be responsible for why the south of the Thames region 
differs from the north in terms of network development. London is in the 
south of England; railways south of London would have a much shorter 
market to begin with, and would be quicker to see commuting as part of 
their business rather than a distraction from longer-distance trafﬁ  c. The 
territory south of the river Thames has geological characteristics that are 
not as conducive to subsurface construction as north of the river, and as 
a result most lines south of the Thames were above ground. Perhaps the 
railways south of the Thames were more entrepreneurial in serving local 
customers as opposed to viewing themselves as main-line railways, as the 
stations north of London did. As of 1854:
Some, like the [south London] lines to Blackwall and Greenwich, already 
provide a frequent service; the London & Croydon had given careful 
thought to the siting of its six suburban stations. But the trunk lines out of 
[north London stations] King’s Cross, Euston and Paddington hardly 
noticed the suburban traveller at all. Each passenger at Euston in 1846 had 
made an average journey of sixty-four miles.
31
And this was true elsewhere in England as well.
There was signiﬁ  cant competition for many years between the London 
Chatham & Dover Railway (LCDR) and the South Eastern Railway (SER), 
as well as between the South Eastern and the London Brighton & South 
Coast Railway (LBSCR) to serve the same markets. This competition 
increased service area coverage (and to a small extent overall service fre-
quency) for customers, and the number of available stations, at the cost of 
railway proﬁ   ts. The LCDR and SER entered a working union in 1899, 
forming the South Eastern & Chatham Railway (SECR). The LBSCR 
remained independent until the 1923 amalgamation with the London & 
South Western and the SECR to form the Southern Railway. Furthermore, 
in the 1920s the Southern came to an agreement with the Underground 
Group that ‘no future application in parliament for an extension of [an 
Underground Group] railway within the Southern Railway’s area and within 
two miles of an existing SR line should be made without giving twelve 
months’ notice to the Southern Railway’.
32 The Southern was also the 
railway that most quickly adapted to electriﬁ  cation, starting in 1931, enabling 
a higher level of service than the steam-powered lines could produce.
33
Competition between Underground and surface rail needs to be accounted 
for. Areas with surface rail service connecting to the City of London did  M



























not have as great a demand for new Underground lines as areas with poor 
service. Hence the area with the fewest surface lines (the north-west) 
attracted the most Underground.
Looking forward, there are several ways to increase the correlation 
between population density and rail service: build new stations where the 
people are (which tends to be expensive, as building stations and railways 
in built-up areas is much more difﬁ  cult than building them in green ﬁ  elds); 
remove stations where the people aren’t (which is fairly inexpensive but 
politically unpopular); limit service so that trains skip low-volume stations; 
or move people to where the stations are (which is difﬁ  cult unless there is 
available (re-) developable land). All of these strategies have been and con-
tinue to be tried. When the distribution of population is taken as a given 
(as in the early years of the development of the rail and Underground 
systems), stations try to match people. Once that is done, the networks may 
try to expand their market by building in green ﬁ  elds and promoting devel-
opment. Metro-land and other suburban developments promoted by the 
railroads are an example of trying to induce the population to move to 
match the network. Several periods of closing stations, especially under-used 
or poorly located surface rail stations, have occurred. World War I and 
World War II were precipitating events, as was rail rationalisation under 
the ‘Beeching axe’ in the 1960s (which did not affect Greater London as 
much as other areas of England, though the Great Central Railway was 
closed north of Aylesbury).
In London, current examples of these strategies are Crossrail, to provide 
new capacity in the densest areas of London (and connect with existing 
suburban lines to the east and west); Docklands Light Rail (DLR) and Jubilee 
Line extension, aiming to re-energise the now obsolete port terminals of 
east London with new service running, in the case of DLR, largely on exist-
ing rights of way; and continued rationalisations of selected lines and sta-
tions to reduce costs and improve service for existing customers. The 
growing incorporation of Calais into the London commuter shed is associ-
ated with the construction of the Channel tunnel and high-speed lines into 
London.
Retro-ﬁ  tting developed areas with rail is expensive, as the early promot-
ers of the London Underground discovered in the 1860s, the builders of the 
deep-level Tube lines rediscovered in the ﬁ   rst decade of the twentieth 
century, and modern-day builders of projects such as the Boston’s Big Dig 
and the Channel tunnel have discovered yet again.
34
Though this article examined London, the issues are common throughout 
large cities that grew up with ﬁ  xed rail infrastructure and faced changes in 
transport and building technology.
35 Roads, and the modes that use them 
(bus and car in particular), provide a great deal more ﬂ  exibility in travel and 
location than does ﬁ  xed rail service, enabling people to move to lower-
density areas with lower housing costs. As people moved from the crowded 
Victorian city to the Edwardian (and later) suburbs they lowered the density 
at the centre and raised it at the edge. However, since the edge has so much  M






































more area than the centre, the density drop in the centre was of a much 
greater magnitude than the rise of density in the suburbs. Once the user’s 
time and the cost of competing modes became competitive with (or superior 
to) rail in the early twentieth century, rail lost market share, making it more 
difﬁ  cult to build new lines and chase the ever mobile passenger.
After a long decline, rail’s market share has increased in London since the 
1980s. Restoring land use to a density and pattern where rail could regain 
dominance is an unlikely future. Selected developments could increase density 
in a few rail-oriented locations and new lines could be built in a limited 
number of high-density un(der)-served corridors, communications technolo-
gies have decreased the pressure for the physical proximity that made the 
City of London (and other downtowns) what they were at rail’s zenith. With 
less need for new hyper-dense commercial agglomerations, there is less need 
for ﬁ  xed-rail transport to serve them, a few exceptions such as the Docklands 
noted. This is not to say rail will not remain important in selected places, 
particularly with congestion, environmental, and parking charges making car 
driving increasingly expensive. Connecting people to the centre of London 
will continue to be a market dominated by trains, and Crossrail should be a 
signiﬁ  cant part of that in coming decades.
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